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Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open 
Questions 
 
By Alvin E. Roth
1 
Harvard University 
This draft: 18 July, 2007 
 
Abstract:  
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had 
a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical 
matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions.  Deferred 
acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around 
the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and 
New York City.   
In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with 
centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a 
marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well.  In particular, marketplaces work well 
when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness 
can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences.  
Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have 
these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized. 
                                                 
1 Prepared for Gale's Feast: a Day in honor of the 85th birthday of David Gale, July 2007, Stony Brook.  
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Introduction:  
 
Matching is one of the important functions of markets. Who gets which jobs, 
which school places, who marries whom, these help shape lives and careers.   
 
Partly for this reason, a substantial literature has grown out of the remarkable 
paper "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage" that David Gale and Lloyd 
Shapley published in The American Mathematical Monthly in 1962 (henceforth GS). In 
that short and almost non-technical paper they proposed a simple model of two-sided 
matching, in which men and women (or students and colleges) each had preferences over 
individuals to whom they might be matched in the other set.  They proposed an algorithm 
for finding a "stable" matching, in which no man or woman is matched to an 
unacceptable mate, and no man and woman who are not matched to each other would 
both prefer to be. The algorithm works by having agents on one side of the market make 
proposals (offers or applications) to agents on the other, in order of preference. Those 
who receive more proposals than they can accept reject their least preferred, but don't 
immediately accept those they don't reject; they instead hold them without commitment, 
and acceptances are deferred until the end of the algorithm. In the meantime, agents who 
have been rejected make new proposals, which lead to new rejections (including of 
proposals that were held at an earlier period but are less preferred than a new proposal), 
until there are no rejected agents who wish to make further proposals. At this point all 
proposals that are being held are finally accepted, to produce a matching. 
 
GS used this deferred acceptance algorithm to prove not only that the set of stable 
outcomes is nonempty for all preferences of the kind they considered, but that, when 
preferences are strict, there always exists, for each side of the market, a stable matching 
that is optimal for agents on that side of the market in the surprisingly strong sense that 
every agent likes the optimal stable matching for his/her side of the market as well as any 
stable matching. They showed in passing that the non-emptiness of the core is related to 
the two-sidedness of the market. And, after appropriate caveats about the abstraction of 
their model from actual college admissions, they stated in closing that (p14) "It is our 
opinion, however, that some of the ideas introduced here might usefully be applied to 
certain phases of the admissions problem." 
 
This opinion has turned out to be well justified.  In the last few years, admissions 
to high schools in New York City, and to all public schools in Boston, have been 
reorganized into clearinghouses that use deferred acceptance algorithms adapted to local 
needs, which solve serious problems encountered by the previously used systems. And it 
turns out that well before GS, similar ideas had been incorporated, in the early 1950's, 
into the successful clearinghouse through which most American doctors still obtain their 
first jobs. We now know that deferred acceptance algorithms have been independently 
discovered a number of times, in part because they capture a "folk idea" of how markets 
operate.  In turn, seeing how clearinghouses operate differently from the less centralized 
marketplaces they replace has yielded new insights into the tasks that markets have to 
perform to work well, whether they are centralized or decentralized. And the design of   2
clearinghouses, and of rules for decentralized markets, has also raised new theoretical 
questions. 
 
This review will be organized as follows.  Section 1 reviews the results presented 
in GS.  Section 2 selectively reviews some subsequent theoretical developments that 
helped set the stage for making these results practical tools for analyzing and designing 
market mechanisms.  Section 3, again selectively, briefly reviews some of the history of 
applications of deferred acceptance algorithms in markets, including some new historical 
details regarding the medical resident match, that came to light in recent discussions.  In 
addition to medical labor markets, I'll discuss matching children to public schools. Labor 
markets and school choice are the applications that have led most directly to the new 
theoretical developments and open questions that I will discuss in Section 4.  Section 5 
will discuss how these developments relate to insights into the detailed working of 
markets, both centralized and decentralized, that have grown from the study of market 
failures and how they can be fixed.  
 
The literature that derives from GS has grown a great deal since Marilda Sotomayor and I 
attempted a comprehensive survey in Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
2 The Science Citation 
Index recently showed 436 citations to GS, 345 of them published after 1990.
3 The 
present review does not attempt even a cursory survey of the whole landscape of new 
developments, but rather traces one path from the original theory, through some empirical 
and practical aspects of subsequent studies and designs of market clearinghouses, to some 
new theoretical questions and research directions. 
 
1. The marriage and college-admissions models  
 
GS  presented  two  closely  related  models  of  two-sided  matching,  differing  only  in 
whether the agents on each side each wish to be matched with one other agent of the 
opposite  sort  (the  "marriage  model"),  or  whether  the  matching  is  many-to-one  (the 
"college admissions" model).   
 
In the marriage model there are two disjoint sets of agents, M = {m1,..., mn} and W = 
{w1,..., wp}, Men and Women,  each of whom has complete and transitive preferences 
over the individuals on the other side (and the possibility of being unmatched, which we 
model as being “matched to yourself”). Preferences can be represented as rank order lists 
of the form P(mi) = w3, w2, ... mi , denoting that man mi’s first choice is w3, his second 
choice w2 [w3 >mi w2] and so on, until at some point he prefers to remain unmatched (i.e. 
matched to himself).  If agent k (on either side of the market) prefers to remain single 
rather than be matched to agent j, i.e. if k >k j, then j is said to be unacceptable to k, and 
in examples preferences will be represented just by the list of acceptable mates. If an 
                                                 
2 Roth and Sotomayor (1990) also includes a more comprehensive account of the intellectual history of 
some of the results discussed here. 
3Further play with the citation index reveals that five authors have cited Gale and Shapley in ten or more 
papers: Roth, Sönmez, Sotomayor, Irving, and Balinski, in 78 papers in various combinations and with 35 
other coauthors. 
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agent is not indifferent between any two acceptable mates, or between being matched to 
an acceptable mate and being unmatched, his or her preferences will be called strict.   
 
An outcome of the game is a matching:  :M W  M W  such that w =  (m) if and only 
if  (w)=m, and for all m and w either  (w) is in M or  (w) = w, and either  (m) is in W 
or  (m) = m.  That is, an outcome matches agents on one side to agents on the other side, 
or to themselves, and if w is matched to m, then m is matched to w. Agents’ preferences 
over outcomes are determined by their preferences for their own mates at those outcomes. 
 
A matching   is blocked by an individual k if k prefers being single to being matched 
with  (k), i.e.  k >k  (k). A matching   is blocked by a pair of agents (m,w) if they each 
prefer each other to the partner they receive at  , i.e. w >m  (m) and m >w  (w). 
 
A matching   is stable if it isn't blocked by any individual or pair of agents. 
 
In the marriage model a stable matching is efficient, and the set of (pairwise) stable 
matchings equals the core of the game whose rules are that agents from opposite sides of 
the market can match if and only if they both agree.  
 
Theorem 1 (GS): A stable matching exists for every marriage market.   
 
GS proved the theorem by presenting and analyzing the following algorithm.
4 
 
GS Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, with men proposing  
 
0.  If some preferences are not strict, arbitrarily break ties (e.g. if some m is indifferent 
between wi and wj, order them consecutively in alphabetical order.  Different agents may 
break ties differently: e.g.. tie-breaking can be random, or decentralized by having each 
agent fill out a strict preference list.) 
 
1 a. Each man m proposes to his 1st choice (if he has any acceptable choices).   
  b. Each woman rejects any unacceptable proposals and, if more than one acceptable 
proposal is received, "holds" the most preferred and rejects all others. 
 
k a.  Any man rejected at step k-1 makes a new proposal to its most preferred acceptable 
mate  who  hasn’t  yet  rejected  him.    (If  no  acceptable  choices  remain,  he  makes  no 
proposal.) 
  b.  Each woman holds her most preferred acceptable offer to date, and rejects the rest. 
 
STOP:  when no further proposals are made, and match each woman to the man (if any) 
whose proposal she is holding. 
 
                                                 
4 At his birthday celebration in Stony Brook on 12 July 2007, David Gale related the story of his 
collaboration with Shapley to produce GS by saying that he (Gale) had proposed the model and definition 
of stability, and had sent to a number of colleagues the conjecture that a stable matching always existed. By 
return mail, Shapley proposed the deferred acceptance algorithm and the corresponding proof.   4
Note that the proof of the theorem now follows from the observation that the algorithm 
always  stops  (since  no  man  proposes  twice  to  the  same  woman)  and  the  matching 
produced in this way is itself stable.  No man ever proposes to an unacceptable woman, 
and no woman ever holds the offer of an unacceptable man, and if some man would 
prefer to be matched to a woman other than his assigned mate, he must, according to the 
algorithm, have already proposed to her, and she has rejected him, meaning she has a 
man she strictly prefers, hence they cannot form a blocking pair.
5 
 
GS observed that which side of the market proposes in a deferred acceptance algorithm 
has consequences. 
 
Theorem 2 (GS): When all men and women have strict preferences, there always exists 
an M-optimal stable matching (that every man likes at least as well as any other stable 
matching), and a W-optimal stable matching.  Furthermore, the matching  M produced by 
the deferred acceptance algorithm with men proposing is the M-optimal stable matching.  
The W-optimal stable matching is the matching  W produced by the algorithm when the 
women propose. 
 
GS  proved  Theorem  2  by  showing  that,  in  the  course  of  the  deferred  acceptance 
algorithm, no man is ever rejected by a woman who could be matched to him at a stable 
matching. 
 
They also showed that the two theorems depend on the two-sided nature of the problem, 
by considering, in contrast, a one-sided "roommates" problem in which every agent has 
preferences over all other agents, and any two agents can be matched together. They 
considered an example in which there are four potential roommates {1,...,4}, such that 1's 
first choice is 2, 2's first choice is 3, and 3's first choice is 1, and 1-3 all rank 4 as their 
last choice. Then (regardless of poor 4's preferences), since each of 1,2, and 3 is the first 
choice of one of the others, no partition of the four potential roommates into two rooms is 
stable, since whoever is matched with 4 will form a blocking pair with the roommate 
whose first choice he is.
6  
 
GS also formulated a many-to-one "college admissions" model populated by a set of 
colleges and a set of students that was identical to the marriage model except that each 
                                                 
5 Sotomayor (1996) provides an equally simple nonconstructive proof of the nonemptiness of the set of 
stable matchings that connects stability with a broader notion of stability with respect to unmatched agents. 
6 While I will not discuss it here, a substantial literature has grown around the issues of finding conditions 
in which the set of stable matchings is non-empty for the roommates problem, and the performance of 
algorithms that can produce them when they exist (for an introduction, see the important contributions of 
Irving, 1985; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Tan, 1991 and Chung, 2000). There were also, over the years, a 
number of results that supported the conjecture that Gale and Shapley’s main results could not be 
generalized beyond a two-sided structure. (One of the most elegant of these is the proof by Abeledo and 
Isaak 1991 that if you model a set of agents as the nodes on a graph, and connect a pair of agents only if 
they are eligible to be matched to one another, and if a stable matching exists for any preferences, then the 
graph must be bipartite, i.e. it must be possible to divide the set of agents into two disjoint sets such that 
agents in one set may only be matched to agents in the other.)  However, the surprising generalization of 
Ostrovsky (2007), which looks at “supply chains” of agents, that are stable if there are no “blocking 
chains,” removes the two-sided restriction in a natural way.   5
college Ci wishes to be matched to qi   1 students, while each student is interested in 
being matched to only 1 college. That is, each student had a preference over colleges, 
each college had a preference over individual students, and a matching was a function 
that assigned each student to no more than one college, and each college Ci to no more 
than qi students. They observed that essentially the same deferred acceptance algorithm 
(with college Ci proposing at each point to its qi most preferred students who hadn't yet 
rejected it in the college-proposing version, or rejecting all but the qi most preferred 
applications it had received at any point of the student-proposing version) would produce 
a stable matching defined as before. That is, the outcome produced by the algorithm 
would not admit any student-college blocking pairs defined precisely as for the marriage 
model.  
  
2. Subsequent developments:  
 
GS implicitly raised a number of interesting questions, and other new questions arose as 
game theory developed and as the model was adapted and used to explore actual markets 
and design new ones.  
 
  2.1 The marriage model 
 
One line of investigation concerns why there are optimal stable matchings for each side 
of the market.  A fruitful line of answers to this question, which generalizes well beyond 
the simple marriage model, is attributed by Knuth (1976) to John Conway.  The essential 
idea is the following.  Suppose everyone has strict preferences and let      be two stable 
matchings.  Then if we ask each man m to point to whichever mate he prefers from the 
two, i.e. to  (m) or  (m), then no two men point to the same woman (since a woman who 
was  pointed  to  by  two  different  men  would  prefer  one  of  them,  and  would  form  a 
blocking pair to one of the matchings with that man, which contradicts the assumption 
that they are stable matchings). So there is a new matching that every man likes at least as 
well as both   and  .  Furthermore, this new matching is itself stable. More generally, let 
the partial order >M on the set of stable matchings be defined for matchings      by   >M 
  if, for every man m in M, either  (m) >m  (m) or  (m) =  (m). That is,   >M   if every 
man agrees that   is at least as good as  . 
 
  Theorem 3 (Lattice Theorem: Conway in Knuth, 1976)
7: When preferences are 
strict, the set of stable matchings is a lattice with respect to the partial order >M . The 
maximum  element  of  the  lattice  is   M,  the  stable  matching  produced  by  the  men-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, and its minimum element is  W, the matching 
produced by the women-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. 
 
                                                 
7 For extensions of the lattice structure to more general matching models, see e.g. Blair (1988), Martínez, 
Massó, Neme and Oviedo (2001), Sotomayor (2000, 2007), and Fleiner (2000), who also discusses the 
connections to matroids, as well as Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), which will be discussed in the next 
section.   6
The Lattice theorem gives insight into other properties of the set of stable matchings, 
such as the following result, also generalizable to more complex models. (Compare the 
set of men who must be matched at the man-optimal stable matching to those who are 
matched at the woman-optimal stable matching, which by the above theorem is the worst 
stable matching for every man, and note that the number of matched men and women 
must be the same at every stable matching…) 
 
Theorem 4 (McVitie and Wilson, 1970): the set of unmatched men and women is 
the same at every stable matching. 
 
Another way to examine the optimal stable matchings is to compare them with 
unstable matchings: 
 
Theorem 5 (Roth, 1982a): The man-optimal stable matching  M is weakly Pareto 
optimal for the men in the set of all matchings (and symmetrically, the W-optimal stable 
matching for the women). That is, there can be no matching (even an unstable matching) 
that all men strictly prefer to the man-optimal stable matching. 
 
The following example (also from Roth 1982a) shows that the theorem can't be 
strengthened to strong Pareto optimality, i.e. it may be possible to make some men better 
off than at  M without making other men worse off.  This example will also be useful 
when  we  discuss  the  ways  in  which  various  results  generalize  beyond  the  marriage 
model, and when we consider the issues that non-strict preferences raise in applications to 
school choice. 
 
Example 1: Let M = {m1, m2, m3} and W = (w1, w2, w3} with preferences given 
by : 
  P(m1) = w2, w1, w3    P(w1) = m1, m2, m3 
  P(m2) = w1, w2, w3    P(w2) = m3, m1, m2 
  P(m3) = w1, w2, w3    P(w3) = m1, m2, m3 
 
Then at  M = [(m1,w1); (m2,w3); (m3,w2)], m1 and m3 each receive their second 
choice mate (while m2 receives his last choice).  But at the (unstable) matching   = 
[(m1,w2); (m2,w3); (m3,w1)], m1 and m3 each receive their first choice, so they are both 
strictly better off than at the man-optimal stable matching  M, and m2 is not worse off.   
 
  Strategic properties: 
 
A different kind of question, which has proved to be of critical importance in market 
design, concerns the strategic properties of a market organized via a clearinghouse. If a 
clearinghouse is organized along the lines of the deferred acceptance algorithm, we can 
ask whether participants will find it in their interest to provide the private information 
about their preferences on which the algorithm depends. Note that the algorithm was 
described above as if people take actions in the course of the algorithm, and we can ask 
whether those actions would best serve their interests. To put the question another way, is 
it  possible  to  design  a  clearinghouse  in  which  a  stable  matching  is  produced  from   7
participants’ stated rank order lists in such a way that it will never be in someone’s 
interest to submit a rank order list different from their true preferences?  The following 
theorems show first that there are limits on what any mechanism that produces stable 
matchings can accomplish in this regard, and then shows a sense in which the deferred 
acceptance algorithm performs up to those limits. (A “stable matching mechanism” is a 
function from any stated preferences to a matching that is stable with respect to those 
preferences.) 
 
Theorem 6 Impossibility Theorem (Roth, 1982a): 
No stable matching mechanism exists for which stating the true preferences is a dominant 
strategy for every agent. 
 
Since a stable matching mechanism has to produce a stable matching for every instance 
of the marriage model, a proof of the Impossibility Theorem can be based on the simplest 
of examples.  Consider the case of two men and two women, with preferences P given by 
P(m1) = w1, w2    P(w1) = m2, m1 
  P(m2) = w2, w1    P(w2) = m1, m2 
Then there are only two stable matchings,  M = [(m1,w1); (m2,w2)], and  W = [(m1,w2); 
(m2,w1)], and so any stable matching mechanism h must produce one of them when the 
stated preferences are P, i.e. h(P) equals  M or  W.  Suppose h(P) =  M (the argument is 
symmetric if h(P) =  W).  Then, if w1 say, were to state that m1 was unacceptable, by 
submitting the preference P’(w1) = m2 (and if everyone else submitted the preferences P, 
so  that  the  stated  preferences  are  P’  =  [P(m1),  P(m2),  P’(w1),  P(w2)]),  the  resulting 
matching would have to be h(P’) =  W since  W is the unique stable matching when 
preferences are P’. So w1 would have profited from this mis-statement of her preferences. 
 
Indeed, anyone who doesn’t end up matched to who they would be matched to at his or 
her optimal stable matching can potentially manipulate a stable mechanism in this way. 
 
Theorem 7 (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990): When any stable mechanism is applied to a 
marriage  market  in  which  preferences  are  strict  and  there  is  more  than  one  stable 
matching,  then  at  least  one  agent  can  profitably  misrepresent  his  or  her  preferences, 
assuming the others tell the truth.  (This agent can misrepresent in such a way as to be 
matched to his or her most preferred achievable mate under the true preferences at every 
stable matching under the mis-stated preferences.) 
 
Indeed,  any  agent  who  receives  a  mate  less  preferred  than  his  or  her  optimal  stable 
matching could profitably manipulate by truncating his or her preference right after that 
mate. However it is possible to design the mechanism so that one side of the market can 
never do any better than to state their true preferences. 
 
Theorem 8 Dominant strategy theorem (Dubins and Freedman 1981, Roth 1982)   
In the game induced by the man-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, in which each 
player states a preference list, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each man to state his 
true preferences.   
   8
The original proofs were difficult, but as is not infrequently the case, easier proofs result 
from the following more powerful theorem. 
 
Theorem 9 Limits on successful manipulation. (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1987). 
Let P be the true preferences (not necessarily strict) of the agents, and let P’ differ from P 
in that some coalition A of men and women mis-state their preferences.  Then there is no 
matching µ, stable for P’, which is preferred to every stable matching under the true 
preferences P by all members of A.  
 
Dubins and Freedman in fact had proved something between Theorems 8 and 9, namely 
that  no  coalition  of  men  could  collectively  manipulate  in  such  a  way  as  to  strictly 
improve all of their mates in comparison to  M. 
 
However, when we consider which of these results are robust to the generalizations that 
will be necessary for models that can be applied to real economic environments, we find 
that, while the possibility of dominant strategy mechanisms for individuals remains, the 
hope that such mechanisms can also prevent coalitions from profitably colluding by mis-
stating their preferences vanishes. 
 
To formalize this we will have to consider more general models, with money and/or 
many-to-one matching, but a good idea of what will generalize and what will not can be 
obtained by reexamining Example 1.  The reason that m1 and m3 don’t get their first 
choices at  M in Example 1 is because of competition with m2.  If m2 were to mis-state 
his  preferences  so  that  only  w3  was  acceptable  to  him,  i.e.  if  he  were  to  state  his 
preferences as P’(m2) = w3, then, if everyone else stated their preferences as before, the 
outcome   would be the result of the deferred acceptance algorithm.  As Theorem 4 
implies, this can’t help m2, but in this case it wouldn’t hurt him either, as he was matched 
to w3 even at  M, i.e. even when he stated his true preferences.  But his mis-statement 
helps m1 and m3, who now get their first choices. So, in a model in which there was the 
possibility of transferring any money at all between agents, m1 or m3 could give a penny 
to m2 from their gains, and the coalition of all the men would benefit.  
 
In a model with many-to-one matching, e.g. between firms and workers, or colleges and 
students, suppose that, in Example 1, m1 and m2 were in fact one agent, m12 with two 
positions. Then the example makes clear that if m12 pursues m1 and m2’s true preferences, 
with a first choice of being matched to both w1 and w2, then m12 will end up matched to 
w2 and w3. But if m12 instead states preferences so that it makes its first proposals to w1 
and w3, then the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm will end after the first 
step,  and  agent  m12  will  be  matched  to  w1  and  w3,  and  will  have  profited  from  the 
misrepresentation, i.e. in this case even the conclusion of Theorem 3 will not carry over 
to a firm that employs many workers.  But to make this precise, we have to consider a 
model in which firms or colleges such as m12, that wish to match to more than one worker 
or student, have preferences over groups and not just individuals.  
  
 
2.2 More general models:   9
 
The  two  main  directions  in  which  related  models  and  generalizations  of  the 
marriage model have developed into substantial literatures involve models in which price 
setting  is  accomplished  simultaneously  with  matching,  and  models  of  many-to-one 
matching.  The  developments  I  recount  here  build  mostly  on  models  of  many-to-one 
matching in which prices are not explicit (but rather are reflected in the preferences that 
agents  may  have  for  jobs,  in  which  e.g.  wages  are  considered  as  part  of  the  job 
description).    However,  I’ll  briefly  mention  some  of  the  models  intended  to  directly 
examine price setting, since they have become important in auction theory and design. 
 
    Models with money 
 
One of the first questions that arose as economists began to think about matching models 
was how to incorporate money into the model, so that it could discuss not only matching, 
but also price determination.  Shapley and Shubik (1972) took an important first step in 
this direction by considering an assignment model in which all preferences are monetary 
in nature. In their model, there are two sets of agents each of whom can be matched to an 
agent on the other side with the result that a certain monetary value will be produced, 
which  may  be  freely  reallocated.
8    They  show  that  the  core  of  the  game  is  always 
nonempty, and that core outcomes do not involve any transfers between agents who are 
not matched to one another.  The payoffs the players receive in the core (which are the 
dual solution to the linear program that finds the matching that maximizes the sum of the 
values)  can  be  interpreted  as  the  prices  that  one  side  receives  from  the  other  in  the 
market, and are influenced by the general level of prices, so that, as in the marriage 
model, there are optimal points in the core for each side of the market, i.e. there is a point 
in the core at which all prices are simultaneously as low as possible, and another at which 
they are as high as possible.   
 
A different approach was to look at the deferred acceptance algorithm itself as a form of 
auction mechanism, in which offers would include a price or wage (in this respect see 
particularly Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor 1986). Kelso and Crawford (1982) is the 
seminal paper in this regard (see also Crawford and Knoer, 1981). Kelso and Crawford 
explored a price adjustment process in which firms bid for workers’ services by offering 
progressively higher wages in a firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. In their 
model, firms could employ groups of workers, and so they also had to consider the form 
that firms’ preferences over groups of workers could take that would allow the deferred 
acceptance algorithm to continue to produce a stable matching.  They observed that this 
will  be  the  case  if  workers  occur  in  firms’  preferences  as  substitutes  rather  than  as 
complements, so that a firm that makes a set of offers to a group of workers and has some 
of those offers rejected does not wish to withdraw any offers to workers who have not 
rejected them. Formally, if a worker w is in a firm f’s most favored choice set at a price 
p(f,w), then if some of the other offers in the choice set are rejected (and henceforth 
unavailable), worker w at price p(f,w) nonetheless remains in (one of) firm f’s most 
                                                 
8 Gary Becker (1981) famously explored related models to illuminate aspects of marriage and household 
production. See also Demange and Gale (1985) for a generalization of the assignment model in the spirit of 
GS.   10
preferred choice set among the remaining set of worker-price contracts available.  (If not, 
then  after  firm  f  received  a  rejection  from  some  worker  w’,  it  might  also  wish  to 
withdraw its offer from worker w, who might have rejected another firm in order to hold 
firm f’s offer, and so instabilities could result.)  Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a 




Models of many-to-one matching 
 
The  college  admissions  model  and  its  descendents  without  explicit  price  formation 
remain very useful for focusing on the matching aspects of models. The question that 
arose as economists began to think about using these models to study actual markets was 
how and to what extent the college admissions model outlined in GS could be extended 
to a well defined game involving many-to-one matching. A model of such a game would 
of course require the preferences of all the participants to be specified over possible 
outcomes, so colleges would need to have preferences defined not just over individual 
students, but over sets of students with whom they might be matched. If the model was to 
be  a  strategic  game,  colleges  would  also  have  strategies  available  that  would  not  be 
available in one-to-one matching. 
 
Roth (1985) examined a ‘minimal’ extension of the GS college admissions model that 
would preserve the main properties of the marriage model to the extent possible, and 
allow strategic issues to be explored.  To this end, consider a model consisting of colleges 
(that seek to match with multiple students) and students (who seek to match with a single 
college).  In addition to the definitions given in GS, let a college Ci with quota qi have 
preferences over sets of students with the property that, for any set S with |S|< qi, and any 
students w and w’ not in S, Ci prefers S w to S w’ if and only if w is preferred to w’ 
under college Ci’s preferences over individual students, and prefers S w to S if and only 
if w is acceptable to Ci. Responsive preferences defined in this way are a special case of 
preferences  in  which  students  are  substitutes  rather  than  complements  in  colleges’ 
preferences (i.e. there is no student who is only desirable if some other student is also in 
                                                 
9   Indeed, for many years there were no good models that unified the parallel results not only for marriage 
and assignment models, but for more general auction and matching models.  Principal among these were 
the dominant strategy results for the deferred acceptance algorithm and for second price auctions, which 
also give agents on one side of the market the core outcome most favorable to them.  Aside from 
solidifying our understanding of the role of substitutes in preferences, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) use 
Tarski’s (1955) theorem (that an increasing function from a lattice to itself has a nonempty set of fixed 
points that form a sublattice) to unify these results, and connect them to the Lattice Theorem for the 
marriage model. (In this connection see also Adachi, 2003, Echenique and Oviedo 2004, 2006,  Fleiner, 
2003, and Ostrovsky, 2007, and, for different uses of Tarski’s theorem in matching, Roth and Sotomayor 
1988, and Sotomayor 2007.)  Another kind of unification between the marriage and assignment models 
involves Abeledo and Rothblum’s (1995) observation that the deferred acceptance algorithm is isomorphic 
to a dual simplex solution of a linear programming problem. There are still many open questions 
concerning when the core will be non-empty for preferences that aren’t for substitutes, but see e.g. 
Echenique and Yenmez (2007), and Pycia (2007) for  models in which workers care about not only which 
firm they are matched to but also who their colleagues are.  See also Hatfield and Kojima (2007) for some 
further discussion of aspects of Hatfield and Milgrom’s (2005) results and their extensions.   11
the entering class).
10 This allows a marriage market to be constructed from any college 
admissions  market  by  representing  each  college  Ci  by  qi  “copies”  each  having  Ci’s 
preferences over individual students and seeking to be matched with one student (and 
such that all of Ci’s copies appear consecutively in each student’s preferences, wherever 
they originally ranked Ci).  Because preferences are responsive, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the stable matchings of the original many-to-one market and this 
related one-to-one marriage market. This allows Theorems 1 and 2 from GS to carry over 
immediately from the marriage model, and the extra structure of the derived marriage 
market even allows some results that concern only stable matchings to be strengthened.
11  
 
However, a correspondence between two sets of stable matchings does not help us draw 
conclusions that involve the comparison of a stable matching with an unstable one, and 
here we find results that do not generalize from the marriage model. In particular, we can 
formalize the re-analysis of Example 1 at the end of section 2.1 with the following formal 
results which show that the conclusions of Theorems 5, 8 and 9 above carry over from 
the marriage model only for the students, who continue to wish to match to a single 
college, and not to the colleges that wish to match to more than one student. 
 
Theorem 10 (Roth, 1985) When the preferences over individuals are strict, the student-
optimal  stable  matching  is  weakly  Pareto  optimal  for  the  students,  but  the  College-
optimal stable matching need not be even weakly Pareto optimal for the colleges. 
 
Theorem  11  (Roth,  1985)  No  stable  matching  mechanism  exists  which  makes  it  a 
dominant strategy for all colleges to state their true preferences, although the student-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm makes it a dominant strategy for all students to 
state their true preferences. 
 
Of course, colleges with multiple seats to fill have more strategic options than just how 
they rank individual students, they also need to reveal how many students they wish to 
admit. Sönmez (1997) considered the strategic decisions faced by colleges constrained by 
some maximum capacity (and who in fact prefer to fill that capacity if they can get the 




Theorem  12  (Sönmez,  1997)  No  stable  matching  mechanism  makes  it  a  dominant 
strategy for a college to always reveal its capacity. 
 
Before  moving  on  to  consider  how  deferred  acceptance  algorithms  may  function  in 
markets,  I  should  note  that  they  have  also  been  studied  as  computational  devices  to 
compute the set of all stable matchings, see for example McVitie and Wilson (1971) for 
                                                 
10 Note that there may be many different preferences over groups of students that are responsive to the same 
preferences over individuals, since e.g. a college with responsive preferences over pairs of students could 
prefer to receive choices 1 and 4 to choices 2 and 3, or vice versa. 
11 We’ll return to how some results for the marriage model can be strengthened when we discuss the Rural 
Hospital Theorem.  See also Roth and Sotomayor (1989) in this connection. 
12 See Sönmez (1999) for some related results.   12
the marriage model, and Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2004) for a general many-
to-many matching model. 
 
3. Deferred acceptance algorithms in practice
13 
 
The first position taken by American doctors after receiving their M.D. degree is now 
called a residency, and it is a job that forms both the backbone of hospitals’ labor force, 
and a critical part of physicians’ graduate education and career path. From 1900 to 1945, 
one avenue that hospitals’ competition for new residents took was to try to hire residents 
earlier than other hospitals. This moved the date of appointment earlier, first slowly and 
then quickly, until by 1945 it was customary for residents to be hired almost two years 
before they would graduate from medical school and begin work. When I studied this in 
Roth (1984) it was the first market in which I had seen this kind of “unraveling” of 
appointment dates, but today we know that unraveling is a common and costly form of 
market failure. (Unraveling, in which offers become not only increasingly early, but also 
dispersed in time and of increasingly short duration, has occurred in other medical labor 
markets in the U.S., Canada, and Britain, and in numerous other kinds of markets; see 
Roth and Xing 1994 for an account of many unraveled markets).
14 
 
In  1945,  the  market  for  residents  received  an  assist  from  a  third  party,  the  medical 
schools, who agreed not to release information about students before a specified date. 
This helped control the date of the market, but a new problem emerged: hospitals found 
that if some of the first offers they made were rejected, the candidates to whom they 
wished to make their next offers had often already accepted other positions.  This led to 
exploding offers to which candidates had to reply immediately, before they could learn 
what other offers might be available, and to a chaotic market that shortened in duration 
from year to year, and resulted not only in missed agreements but also in broken ones.  
This kind of congestion also has since been seen in other markets, and in the extreme 
form it took in the American medical market by the late 1940's, it also constitutes a form 
of market failure (cf. Roth and Xing 1997, and Avery, Jolls, Roth, and Posner 2007 for 
detailed accounts of congestion in labor markets in psychology and law). 
 
Faced with the costs of a market that was working very badly, the various American 
medical associations (of hospitals, students, and schools) agreed to employ a centralized 
clearinghouse to coordinate the market.  After students had applied to residency programs 
and  been  interviewed,  instead  of  having  hospitals  make  individual  offers  to  which 
students had to respond immediately, students and residency programs would instead be 
invited  to  submit  rank  order  lists  to  indicate  their  preferences.  That  is,  hospitals 
(residency programs) would rank the students they had interviewed, students would rank 
                                                 
13 The historical discussion of the American market for interns and residents is based on Roth (1984) and 
Roth (2003), in which more detailed accounts can be found, and on conversations in 2007 with Elliott 
Peranson, prompted by an initial draft of this section. 
14 On the costs of such unraveling in some markets for which unusually good data have been available, see 
Niederle and Roth (2003) on the market for Gastroenterology Fellows, and Fréchette, Roth, and Unver 
(2007) on the market for post-season college football bowls. For some very recent unraveled markets, see 
Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2003) on college admissions; and Avery, Jolls, Posner, and Roth (2001) 
on appellate court clerks.   13
the  hospitals  (residency  programs)  they  had  interviewed,  and  a  centralized 
clearinghouse—a  matching  mechanism—would  be  employed  to  produce  a  matching 
from  the  preference  lists.  Today  this  centralized  clearinghouse  is  called  the  National 
Resident Matching Program (NRMP). 
 
The original algorithm proposed for the medical clearinghouse (Mullen and Stalnaker, 
1952) was an unstable mechanism that also made it risky, in an obvious way, for students 
to list their true preferences. It was replaced at the last minute with another algorithm, 
adapted from a prior regional clearinghouse called the Boston Pool Plan (see Roth, 2003), 
and this was the one actually employed starting in 1952, the first year that matches were 
decided through the clearinghouse.  This change of algorithms was not well documented, 
however.  Roth (1984) showed that the algorithm adopted in 1952 is equivalent to the 
hospital proposing deferred acceptance algorithm as a matching mechanism, in the sense 
that it produces the hospital-optimal stable matching, even though the two algorithms are 
themselves not exactly the same (and require different inputs; see the Appendix for a 
description of the 1952 algorithm). 
 
Deferred  acceptance  algorithms  seem  to  have  been  independently  invented  twice  in 
connection  with  the  NRMP  medical  clearinghouse.  Elliott  Peranson  (personal 
communication) tells me that when he was first hired to propose a match like the NRMP 
match to be used for medical school admissions in 1972, he initially thought, based on 
the  available  literature,  that  the  NRMP  used  the  originally  proposed  algorithm  as 
described by Mullen and Stalnaker (1952). He recognized its flaws, and independently 
developed a deferred acceptance algorithm.
15  After giving a presentation on this subject 
to the AAMC, he was invited to help organize the NRMP match, and implemented his 
version of a hospital proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
16 
 
Indeed, deferred acceptance algorithms, with some variations, have been independently 
developed in quite a few markets over time, in part because, when a clearinghouse is 
called for to replace some market failure, deferred acceptance seems to correspond to a 
"folk model" of how markets proceed when they work in an orderly fashion.
17 See for 
                                                 
15 "The night before we were leaving for Washington to give the seminar I was working through an 
example I was going to present, and realized the algorithm wasn't working very well. I called my colleague, 
and together over a couple of beers we came up with what turned out to be the deferred acceptance 
algorithm. I revised the seminar late that night to say we didn't think NRMP worked properly." (personal 
communication, 3/30/07) 
16 In the process of doing so, he also discovered his mistake about the algorithm that was in fact being used. 
Peranson writes: "...we went to the NRMP office, I gave them some examples to work through to see if I 
was right about how their algorithm didn't work... The next day, we went back to NRMP and, based on 
their solutions to the examples, I discovered that they were in fact using a deferred acceptance algorithm. 
(At least they claimed that's how it worked - it had been computerized just recently, the computer system 
didn't work very well, and I'm not sure anyone knew what the computer programs really did to produce a 
matching)." 
17 I include here clearinghouses that are equivalent to deferred acceptance algorithms even if this 
equivalence is not always apparent.  See e.g. Guillen and Kesten (2007) who discuss study a procedure 
used to allocate rooms in an MIT dormitory, which they show is equivalent to a deferred acceptance 
algorithm with certain conventions applied to the "preferences" that rooms have for students. That such   14
example the rules for the telephone market by which clinical psychologists attempted to 
fill their positions (Roth and Xing 1997), prior to adopting a centralized clearinghouse in 
1999.  That  market  was  codified  by  rules  that  looked  very  much  like  the  deferred 
acceptance algorithm: employers made offers starting at 9:00am on "selection day", and 
candidates  were  obliged  to  hold  no  more  than  one  offer  at  a  time;  they  were  to 
immediately  call  and  reject  any  offer  they  were  holding  if  they  decided  to  hold  a 
subsequent offer. Aside from the fact that this was a decentralized market (in which 
employers and candidates could make decisions at each part of the process, rather than 
submitting a rank order list of preferences to be followed from the outset), it resembled 
the  deferred  acceptance  algorithm  except  for  one  crucial  difference:  the  process 
terminated not when no further offers remained to be made, but rather at 4:00pm, at 
which point offers that were not yet accepted would no longer be available.  Because this 
didn't allow all offers to be made, a great deal of strategic behavior had developed that 




Over the years, changes in the medical marketplace made a simple deferred acceptance 
algorithm less able to accommodate the requirements of the market. These included some 
which preserved preferences as substitutes, and some that did not. An example of the first 
kind of change is that hospitals sometimes wish to manage the number of residents in 
multiple programs who might do similar kinds of work, so that they might want to have 
10 residents in program A and 5 in program B, but be sure to have 15 in total, so that if 
program B filled only 4 of its 5 positions they would like to fill 11 positions in program 
A.  Note that the hospital's preferences to hire an 11
th person in program A only if it 
cannot  hire  a  5
th  person  in  program  B  treat  those  people  as  substitutes,  rather  than 
complements, e.g. those preferences would not cause a hospital to withdraw an offer it 
had made when it received a rejection of another offer.  
 
An example of a change in the market that involved preferences that are not substitutes 
had  to  do  with  the  growing  number  of  married  couples  graduating  from  American 
medical schools and wishing to be matched to jobs in the same vicinity. This hadn't been 
a problem when the match was created in the 1950's, when virtually all medical students 
were  men.  By  the  1960's  it  was  enough  of  a  problem  that  the  match  had  tried  to 
accommodate couples. In the early 1970's the first attempt to fully automate the matching 
of  couples  permitted  two  students  to  identify  themselves  as  a  couple,  and  define 
                                                                                                                                                 
procedures are computationally efficient, i.e. the fact that they can be used to quickly compute an 
allocation, is of course part of their practical appeal. 
18 In the 20 years before our study of that market it had regularly undergone rule changes designed to 
address some of the failings of the market. Most notable of these was that the duration of the market had 
decreased from a week to a day.  This allowed everyone to stay by their phones from beginning to end, 
and, by reducing the time it took to reject an offer after receiving a preferable one, it increased the effective 
length of the market, basically the number of offers that could be made. But, as we argued in Roth and 
Xing (1997), there wasn't enough time for the market to fully clear in a straightforward way, because after a 
short time only a very few people were holding two offers at a time, and even very speedy phone calls 
didn't allow the deferred acceptance process to reach its natural conclusion; the deadline was always 
potentially binding. (For this reason, this was a market in which employers elicited from applicants the 
promise that they would accept a job immediately if called on the morning of selection day, and often made 
offers to applicants from whom they had received such promises.)   15
"communities" of hospitals in which they would like to both be matched. However, both 
members of the couple continued to submit rank order lists as individuals, and had to 
declare one of their members the "leading member," with the preference list of the other 
member then being processed in a manner to facilitate matching to the same community. 
While this mechanism often matched the members of the couple to positions in the same 
city,  couples  often  declined  to  take  these  positions,  and  instead  managed  to  arrange 
positions  they  preferred.  In  Roth  (1984)  I  observed  that  if  couples  were  modeled  as 
having preferences over pairs of positions, this could be understood as responding in a 
natural way to the instability of the resulting matching.
19  I further observed that when 
couples had preferences over pairs of positions, the set of stable matchings could be 
empty. And, secure in my observer status as an economic theorist (and not yet a market 
designer), I concluded by noting, therefore, "that even when couples are allowed to state 




I therefore felt at least a little dismay when, in 1995, I was invited to direct the redesign 
of the medical match, in response to a crisis in confidence that had developed regarding 
its ability to continue to serve the medical market, and whether it appropriately served 
student interests.
21 As a designer, I would no longer have the luxury of simply observing 
that some problems are hard: e.g. more than a thousand people go through the match each 
year as members of couples, and have to be matched.
22 And the empirical evidence was 
clear  that  stability  was  important  to  the  success  of  matches.  Roth  (1990,  1991)  had 
studied  the  clearinghouses  that  had  been  tried  in  the  various  regions  of  the  British 
National  Health  Service,  after  those  markets  unraveled  in  the  1960’s.  A  Royal 
Commission  had  recommended  that  clearinghouses  be  established  on  the  American 
model,  but  since  the  American  medical  literature  didn’t  describe  in  detail  how  the 
clearinghouse worked, each region of the NHS adopted a different algorithm for turning 
rank order lists into matches, and the unstable mechanisms had largely failed and been 
abandoned, while the stable mechanisms succeeded and survived.
23 
 
                                                 
19 Couples are of course subject to the iron law of marriage, that you can't be happier than your spouse (at 
least not in equilibrium). 
20 Ronn (1990) showed that the problem of finding if a given profile of preferences has a stable matching is 
NP hard when couples are present. 
21 In this respect, the fact that the algorithm was a hospital proposing deferred acceptance algorithm became 
a point of debate, as did the question of whether students were or should be submitting preferences 
strategically.  By this time many adaptations to the initial algorithm had already been made, including 
allowing couples to state preferences over pairs of positions, so it was no longer a simple hospital-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. 
22 I was acutely aware that, of all the results on matching presented in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), the only 
ones that directly applied to the medical match were the counterexamples such as those concerning couples 
and the possible absence of stable matchings. 
23 Of course, there are other differences between regions of the British health service than how they 
organized their medical clearinghouses, so there was also room for controlled experiments in the laboratory 
on the effects of stable and unstable clearinghouses; see Kagel and Roth (2002). And some of the 
differences between British and U.S. markets raised interesting theoretical questions as well, see e.g. Roth 
(1991) and Irving (1998) on various consequences of the fact that graduating British doctors until recently 
needed two positions.   16
Roth and Peranson (1999) reports on the new clearinghouse algorithm that we designed, a 
generalized  applicant-proposing  deferred  acceptance  algorithm  that  allows  couples  to 
state  preferences  over  pairs  of  positions,  allows  hospitals  to  specify  reversions  of 
positions, and deals with some other features of the market as well, such as allowing 
individuals  who  need  to  arrange  two  consecutive  positions  of  different  sorts  to  state 
supplemental rank order lists that will apply to one kind of position depending on what 
complementary  position  the  person  is  matched  to.    Unlike  the  deferred  acceptance 
algorithm for simpler matching markets, this does not produce a stable matching on the 
first  pass  through  agents'  preferences.  Instead,  a  list  of  potential  blocking  pairs  is 
accumulated (e.g. every time one member of a couple is displaced from a position and 
causes  the  other  member  of  the  couple  to  be  withdrawn  from  a  position),  and  the 
algorithm  attempts  to  satisfy  these  pairs  one  at  a  time,  using  a  class  of  algorithms 
explored in Roth and Vande Vate (1990). But, to be clear about the relationship to the 
deferred  acceptance  algorithm  in  GS,  this  is  a  generalization  in  the  sense  that  if  all 
hospitals  and  applicants  submitted  simple  preferences  (without  couples,  reversions  of 
positions, etc.) the algorithm would produce the applicant optimal stable matching. The 
new  algorithm  has  been  used  by  the  NRMP  since  1998,  and  has  subsequently  been 
adopted by over three dozen labor market clearinghouses (see Table 1).
24 The empirical 
evidence that has developed in use is that the set of stable matchings is very seldom 
empty but is often very small, and in the next section we’ll discuss some of the new 
theoretical questions these results raise.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
An interesting historical note is that the use of deferred acceptance algorithms has been 
explicitly recognized as part of a pro-competitive market mechanism in American law. 
This  came  about  because  in  2002,  over  a  dozen  law  firms  representing  three  former 
medical residents brought an antitrust suit challenging the use of the matching system for 
medical residents. The theory of the suit was that the matching system was a conspiracy 
to hold down wages for residents and fellows, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
25  
                                                 
24 The establishment of a clearinghouse interacts with the extent of a market. Thus in Table 1, almost all 
entry level medical residencies, in almost all specialties, are handled simultaneously by the NRMP 
clearinghouse, and we can therefore consider that to be a single market, even though very few if any 
applicants will be in the market for, say, both psychiatry and surgery positions.  On the other hand, the 
various subspecialties of Internal Medicine are separate markets, partly due to the different elective training 
that residents must take to prepare for them, but partly now because they have separate matches. Following 
our work in helping to re-establish a Gastroenterology match (Niederle and Roth, 2004, 2005, Niederle, 
Proctor and Roth, 2006), Muriel Niederle and I are now discussing with Orthopedic Surgery fellowship 
directors the possibility of establishing a comprehensive match, and this involves assessing the extent to 
which e.g. Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery do or could constitute separate markets, or parts of a single 
market for orthopedic surgery fellowships. 
25 Bulow and Levin (2006) sketch a simple model of one-to-one matching in which a centralized 
clearinghouse, by enforcing impersonal wages (i.e. the same wage for any successful applicant) could cause 
downward pressure on wages (see also Kamecke 1998). Subsequent analysis suggests more skepticism 
about any downward wage effects in actual markets. See, for example, Kojima (2007) which shows that the 
Bulow-Levin results don’t follow in a model in which hospitals can employ more than one worker, and 
Niederle (forthcoming) who shows that the results don’t follow in a model that includes reversions. 
(Niederle shows how, in a model with reversions, like those in the NRMP, the difference between hospital 
and applicant proposing deferred acceptance algorithms may be different than in a simple matching market,   17
Niederle and Roth (2003) observed that, empirically, the wages of medical specialties 
with  and  without  centralized  matching  in  fact  do  not  differ.  An  interesting,  game 
theoretic aspect of the suit itself was that it was a double class action suit, that sought not 
only to represent the class of all former medical residents, but sought to sue a class of 
defendants  that  included  all  hospitals  that  employ  residents,  including  several  dozen 
named defendants.  This had the effect of making the legal defense costs very high, as 
lawyers for the many defendants had to coordinate with one another in each of the many 
preliminary motions and hearings expected to stretch over years. Thus the strategy of the 
plaintiffs seemed aimed at trying to force a financial settlement before the otherwise 
lengthy process reached trial. However the same strategy that made legal defense costly 
made it possible for the defendants to seek legislative relief from the suit, since virtually 
every senator and congressman has a hospital in his district. The struggle thus shifted to 
the Congress, and Public Law 108-218 (2004) notes that the medical match is a pro-
competitive market mechanism, not a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
26 
                                                                                                                                                 
e.g. in some circumstances both the hospital and student-proposing versions of the algorithm could produce 
the hospital optimal stable matching even when it is different from the student optimal stable matching.) 
Crawford (forthcoming) considers how the deferred acceptance algorithm of Kelso and Crawford (1982) 
could be adapted to adjust personal wages in a centralized clearinghouse, see also Artemov, forthcoming. 
26 The law states in part: “Congress makes the following findings: For over 50 years, most United States 
medical school seniors and the large majority of graduate medical education programs (popularly known as 
`residency programs') have chosen to use a matching program to match medical students with residency 
programs to which they have applied. These matching programs have been an integral part of an 
educational system that has produced the finest physicians and medical researchers in the world.  
  “Before such matching programs were instituted, medical students often felt pressure, at an 
unreasonably early stage of their medical education, to seek admission to, and accept offers from, residency 
programs. As a result, medical students often made binding commitments before they were in a position to 
make an informed decision about a medical specialty or a residency program and before residency 
programs could make an informed assessment of students' qualifications. This situation was inefficient, 
chaotic, and unfair and it often led to placements that did not serve the interests of either medical students 
or residency programs.                  
  “The original matching program, now operated by the independent non-profit National Resident 
Matching Program and popularly known as `the Match', was developed and implemented more than 50 
years ago in response to widespread student complaints about the prior process. This Program includes on 
its board of directors individuals nominated by medical student organizations as well as by major medical 
education and hospital associations.              
  “The Match uses a computerized mathematical algorithm, as students had recommended, to 
analyze the preferences of students and residency programs and match students with their highest 
preferences from among the available positions in residency programs that listed them. Students thus obtain 
a residency position in the most highly ranked program on their list that has ranked them sufficiently high 
among its preferences. Each year, about 85 percent of participating United States medical students secure a 
place in one of their top 3 residency program choices.          
  “Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, 
have the potential to undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process. The costs 
of defending such litigation would divert the scarce resources of our country's teaching hospitals and 
medical schools from their crucial missions of patient care, physician training, and medical research. In 
addition, such costs may lead to abandonment of the matching process, which has effectively served the 
interests of medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a century.   
  “… It is the purpose of this section to—confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit sponsoring, 
conducting, or participating in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do 
so; and ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or participate in such matching programs are not subjected 
to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges such matching programs under the 
antitrust laws.”   18
 
A  different  area  of  application  developed  during  this  period,  involving  the  use  of 
clearinghouses based on deferred acceptance algorithms for assigning children to schools. 
The clearinghouses designed for New York City high schools and for Boston Public 
Schools at all levels are described in Abdulkadiro lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005, 2007) and 
Abdulkadiro lu,  Pathak,  Roth,  and  Sönmez  (2005,  2007).  The  New  York  City 
clearinghouse has been in operation since 2003 (for students entering high school in 
September  2004),  and  the  Boston  clearinghouse  went  into  operation  in  2005-06  for 
students entering school in September 2006. The problems that these designs are intended 
to solve are quite different: in New York, the school choice system is a two-sided market 
in which the schools are active players, but in Boston the schools are passive, and the 
problem is a one-sided market as studied by Abdulkadiro lu and Sönmez (2002), who 
observed that deferred acceptance algorithms might often be sensible even when stability 
per se was not required to stop blocking pairs from forming. In Boston in particular, 
where the new clearinghouse is a straightforward student-proposing deferred acceptance 
algorithm, the central issue in its adoption was  that  it  would  give  students  and  their 
families a dominant strategy to state their true preferences.  School choice in Boston had 
previously been organized through a centralized clearinghouse that was not at all strategy 
proof
27, and one of the factors in the adoption  of the new system was that it would 
eliminate the need for students and families to "game the system."  
 
These school choice clearinghouses are the applications that are most in the spirit of the 
“college admissions” discussed by GS, but they also raise new theoretical questions. The 
one I’ll address in the next section has to do with how indifferences are treated, which is 
an important question in a system in which many children may be indistinguishable from 
the point of view of a given school, but in which ties must somehow be broken because 
there are insufficient places at particular schools to accommodate all children in the same 
indifference class. 
 
4. New theory, open questions and research directions 
 
In this section, I'll attempt to briefly and fairly informally describe some of the new 
theoretical questions that arose in the course of analyzing and designing these various 
clearinghouses. 
 
One question that arose in connection with the resident match concerns rural hospitals. 
These often cannot fill all their residency positions, and a disproportionate number of 
those they do hire are graduates of foreign medical schools. Since the vast majority of 
residency positions are filled through the match, the question was, when a new match 
algorithm is being written, can it relieve the plight of these hospitals?  Given that the 
empirical evidence supported the view that stability is an important component of match 
success, the following theorem answers that question in the negative. (Note that the first 
part  of  the  theorem  is  a  straightforward  generalization  of  the  result  of  McVitie  and 
                                                 
27 A great deal can be learned by studying flawed existing allocation systems. In this connection see e.g. 
Balinski and Sonmez (1999), Ergin and Sonmez (2006), and Pathak and Sonmez (2007).   19
Wilson for the marriage model, but the second part has no parallel when matching is one-
to-one.) 
 
Theorem  13:  (Rural  Hospital  Theorem,  Roth  1986):  When  all  preferences  over 
individuals  are  strict,  and  hospitals  have  responsive  preferences,  the  set  of  students 
employed and positions filled is the same at every stable matching. Furthermore, any 
hospital that has some empty positions at some stable matching is assigned precisely the 
same set of students at every stable matching. 
  
As already mentioned, a different kind of problem was caused by the presence of couples, 
which  might  make  the  set  of  stable  matchings  empty.  The  counterexamples  in  Roth 
(1984) and also in unpublished work by Sotomayor each involved two couples and four 
hospitals, in which blocking pairs had to be identified for 24 matchings to show that none 
were stable. Today we can show this much more simply. Klaus and Klijn (2005) show 
that, except when all couples have preferences that are (“weakly”) responsive to their 
individual preferences (i.e. except in the case of "couples" who have preferences as if 
they were single, and don't alter their preferences for their own jobs depending on where 
the other member of the couple is employed), examples that include a given couple can 
always be constructed with no stable matchings.
28 
 
Example  2--market  with  one  couple  and  no  stable  matchings (Klaus and Klijn): Let 
c=(s1,s2) be a couple, and suppose there is another single student s3, and two hospitals 
h1 and h2.  Suppose that the acceptable matches for each agent, in order of preference, 
are given by 
  
c: (h1,h2)
29;   s3: h1, h2,  
h1: s1, s3;  h2: s3, s2 
  
Then no individually rational matching  (i.e. no  that matches agents only to acceptable 
mates) is stable. We consider two cases, depending on whether the couple is matched or 
unmatched. 
  
Case 1: (c)=(h1,h2). Then s3 is unmatched, and s/he and h2 can block , because h2 
prefers s3 to  (h2)=s2. 
  
Case 2:  (c)=c (unmatched).  If  (s3)=h1, then (c, h1,h2) blocks . If  (s3)=h2 or  
(s3)=s3 (unmatched), then (s3,h1) blocks . 
                                                 
28 In keeping with the general informality of this review, I don't include a formal definition of instability 
involving couples, who e.g. could participate in blocking pairs together with one or two employers. The 
example should nevertheless be clear. 
29 Couple c submits a preference list over pairs of positions, and specifies that only a single pair, h1 for 
student s1 and h2 for student s2 is acceptable.  Otherwise couple c prefers to remain unmatched.  Note that 
this preference is not responsive to any individual preferences that has, say, s1 preferring h1 to being 
unmatched, since the couple does not prefer the option at which s1 is matched to h1 and s2 is unmatched to 
the option of both being unmatched. For a couple, this could make perfect sense, if e.g. h1 and h2 are in a 
different city than the couple now resides, and they will move only if they find two good jobs.  
   20
  
Aldershof and Carducci (1996) further showed by example that, even when the set of 
stable  matchings  is  nonempty,  when  couples  are  present  there  need  not  be  a  lattice 
structure, or optimal stable matchings, nor is the set of unmatched agents the same at 
every stable matching. Indeed, there aren't any ready parallels to any of the standard 
results  for  models  in  which  couples  are  present  (with  the  exception  of  the  various 
impossibility results; the presence of couples certainly doesn't make it easier to construct 
strategy-proof stable mechanisms). 
 
However, one of the empirical observations of Roth and Peranson (1998) was that, in the 
large medical market studied there, with over 20,000 positions and almost that many 
applicants,  the  standard  results  seemed  to  provide  a  very  good  approximation.  For 
example, only about one in 100,000 positions switched from being matched to unmatched 
when applicant and employer-proposing variants of the algorithm were compared.  In 
general, the set of stable matchings seemed to be quite small, and there appeared to be 
very few opportunities for profitable manipulation of preferences or capacities, even for 
agents who were not on the proposing side. This latter result is surprising, because in a 
simple marriage model in which agents on each side have preferences over all the agents 
on the other side, the set of stable matchings becomes large as the number of agents 
grows (e.g. when preferences are uncorrelated), so that at any stable matching, many 
agents are not receiving their optimal stable match, and so could profitably manipulate 
their preferences (recall Theorem 7). But in the medical market, most rank order lists 
submitted by applicants had no more than fifteen residency programs listed. Roth and 
Peranson showed computationally that if, as such a market gets large, the number of 
places that a given applicant interviews (and hence the size of his rank order list) does not 
grow, then the set of stable matchings becomes small (when preferences are strict). 
 
This observation has sparked some new theory, and raised some conjectures. Immorlica 
and Mahdian (2005) showed analytically that in the marriage model with uncorrelated 
preferences,  the  set  of  people  who  are  matched  to  different  mates  at  different  stable 
matchings grows small as the market grows large in this way, and that therefore the 
opportunities for profitable manipulation grow small.   
 
Kojima and Pathak (2007) substantially extend this result to the case of many-to-one 
matching, in which opportunities for employers to profitably manipulate can occur even 
when  there  is  a  unique  stable  matching,  and  in  which  employers  can  manipulate 
capacities as well as preferences. They look at a sequence of markets with randomly 
generated preferences (in which employers may have arbitrary responsive preferences), 
indexed by the number of employers. They define an infinite sequence of markets of 
increasing  size  n  to  be regular if the length k of applicants'  random  preference  lists 
remains constant
30, the capacity of each employer is bounded, the number of applicants 
doesn't  grow  faster  than  the  total  capacity  of  all  employers,  and  each  applicant  is 
acceptable to every employer. They prove the following. 
                                                 
30 Students’ preferences are drawn independently from the same distribution. For each student, colleges are 
selected from the same probability distribution, one at a time, until k colleges have been picked (for a fixed 
k), these are the student's k top choices in  the order selected.   21
 
Theorem 14 (Kojima and Pathak, 2007): In the limit, as n goes to infinity in a regular 
sequence of random markets, the proportion of employers who might profit from (any 
combination of) preference or capacity manipulation goes to zero in the worker proposing 
deferred acceptance algorithm. 
 
A second empirical observation made in the resident match data, and in the other matches 
in Table 1, is that, even when couples are present, it is a very rare occurrence for the set 
of  stable  matchings  to  be  empty.  In  the  vast  majority  of  cases  a  stable  matching  is 
produced.
31  This  is  true  even  though  we  have  seen  that  it  is  easy  to  produce  small 
examples in which no stable matching exists.  An open question is why this is so.  I offer 
the following loose conjecture: 
 
Conjecture: In the limit, as n goes to infinity in a regular sequence of random markets in 
which the proportion of couples is bounded [or, goes to zero], the probability that the set 
of stable matchings is empty goes to zero. 
 
This conjecture is loosely specified in a number of ways, one of which is that I haven’t 
specified  from  what  kind  of  distribution  couples’  preferences  should  be  drawn.  We 
already know from Klaus and Klijn (2005) that if the couples all look too much like 
individuals, the set of stable matchings will always be nonempty. I would imagine that a 
simple way to start would be to consider a world in which there are multiple locations, 
with couples having some nontrivial tradeoff between personal preferences for positions, 
and the desire to be in the same location as their spouse. 
 
Note  that  this  conjecture  might  seem  counterintuitive,  given  that  the  set  of  stable 
matchings becomes small as the market becomes large in this way. That is, it might be 
thought that in larger markets, with smaller sets of stable matchings, the likelihood that 
the set of stable matchings would be empty would be larger. My conjecture, based on 
field observations, is the opposite. 
  
  As noted earlier, the question of indifferences arises when considering school 
choice.    When  schools,  say,  have  responsive  preferences  arising  from  non-strict 
preferences over individuals, stable matchings will still exist, but optimal stable matches 
in the strong sense of Theorem 2 will no longer exist. Instead, we can consider the set of 
stable matchings that are Pareto optimal for students, i.e. each with the property that there 
is no stable matching that gives some students more preferred assignments without giving 
other students less preferred assignments. The problem is how to break ties to achieve 
one of these Pareto optimal matchings, since random or arbitrary tie breaking may fail to 
do so (even in the simple case of one-to-one matching). We can see this by looking back 
at Example 1, and modifying it so that not all preferences are strict. 
 
                                                 
31 The Roth-Peranson algorithm could fail to find a stable matching even when one exists. In the matches in 
Table 1, my understanding is that in the last ten years there have been fewer than half a dozen occasions on 
which no stable matching was found.   22
Example 1' (Tie breaking can be inefficient): All preferences are as in Example 
1, except for those of w1, and let w1 be indifferent between any of m1, m2, m3.  Suppose, 
at step 0 of the deferred acceptance algorithm, the ties in w1's preferences are broken so 
as to produce the (artificial) strict preference P(w1) = m1, m2, m3.  Now the analysis is the 
same as in Example 1, and the deferred acceptance algorithm operating on the artificial 
strict preferences produces  M = [(m1,w1); (m2,w3); (m3,w2)], at which m1 and m3 each 
receive their second choice mate (while m2 receives his last choice).  As in our original 
analysis of Example 1,  matching   = [(m1,w2); (m2,w3); (m3,w1)], is Pareto superior for 
the men, as m1 and m3 each receive their first choice, so they are both strictly better off 
than at  M, and m2 is not worse off.  The difference from Example 1 is that in the present 
example, since w1 is in fact indifferent between her possible mates, the matching    is 
also stable.  The pair (w1, m2) is not a blocking pair for  , and only appeared to be 
because  of  the  arbitrary  ways  in  which  ties  were  broken  in  the  deferred  acceptance 
algorithm to make w1's preferences look strict.  
 
So, there are costs to arbitrary or random tie breaking.  Kesten (2004), Erdil and 




Kesten observes that the reason that students are collectively better off at   than at   
 M  (in  Example  1  as  well  as  1’)
33
  can  be  traced  to  the  operation  of  the  deferred 
acceptance algorithm, in which m2’s fruitless attempt to match with w1 harms m1 and m3 
without  yielding  m2  any  benefit.    Kesten  defines  an  efficiency  adjusted  deferred 
acceptance mechanism that produces   in Examples 1 or 1’ by disallowing the blocking 
pair (w1, m2) even in Example 1 with strict preferences, under an extended notion of 
“reasonable fairness” that generalizes stable matchings.  He further observes that there is 
no mechanism that is Pareto efficient, reasonably fair, and strategy proof. 
 
To understand Erdil and Ergin's approach, note that in Example 1', the Pareto 
improvement from  M to   arises from an exchange of positions between m1 and m3. The 
key observation is that this exchange doesn't introduce any new blocking pairs, since, 
among those who would like to change their positions, m1 and m3 are among the most 
preferred candidates of w1 and w2. Since there weren't any blocking pairs to the initial 
matching, this kind of exchange can occur without any new blocking pairs being created 
by the exchange of positions. 
 
Formally, Erdil and Ergin define a stable improvement cycle starting from some 
stable matching to be a cycle of students who each prefer the school that the next student 
                                                 
32 In the computer science literature there has been a focus on the computational costs of non-strict 
preferences, which adds to the computational complexity of some calculations (but not others), see e.g. 
Irving (1994) and Irving, Manlove, and Scott (2000). When preferences aren't strict, not all stable 
matchings will have the same number of matched people, and Manlove, Irving, Iwama, Miyazaki and 
Morita (2002) show that the problem of finding a maximal stable matching is NP hard. 
33 Kesten’s concern is not with tie-breaking per se but with the general question of Pareto efficiency for 
students in school choice problems in which schools don’t have preferences that enter into welfare or 
strategy considerations.   23
in  the  cycle  is  matched  to,  and  each  of  whom  is  one  of  the  school's  most  preferred 
candidates among the students who prefer that school to their current match. They prove 
the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 15 (Erdil and Ergin, 2007): If   is a stable matching that is Pareto dominated 
(from the point of view of students) by another stable matching, then there is a stable 
improvement cycle starting from   . 
 
Erdil and Ergin show that, as a result, there is a computationally efficient algorithm that 
produces stable matchings that are Pareto optimal with respect to students. The initial 
step of the algorithm is a student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with arbitrary 
tie-breaking  of  non-strict  preferences  by  schools.  The  output  of  this  process  (i.e.  the 
student optimal stable matching of the market with artificially strict preferences) is then 
improved by finding and satisfying stable improvement cycles, until no more remain.  
They observe, however, that this algorithm is not strategy-proof, i.e. unlike the student-
proposing  deferred  acceptance  algorithm,  this  deferred  acceptance  plus  stable 
improvement cycle algorithm doesn't make it a dominant strategy for students to state 
their true preferences. They show in fact that no mechanism that always produces a stable 
matching that is Pareto optimal for the students can be strategy proof. 
 
Abdulkadiro lu, Pathak and Roth (2007) show that no mechanism (stable or not, and 
Pareto  optimal  or  not)  that  is  better  for  students  than  the  student  proposing  deferred 
acceptance algorithm with tie breaking can be strategy proof. That is, we'll say that one 
mechanism dominates another if for every profile of preferences the first mechanism 
produces a matching that is at least as good for every student as the matching produced 
by the second mechanism, and for some preference profiles the first mechanism produces 
a matching that is preferred by some students. Following the design of the New York and 
Boston school choice mechanisms, define a tie-breaking rule T to be an ordering of 
students that is applied to any school's preferences to produce a strict order of students 
within  each  of  the  school's  indifference  classes  (that  is,  when  a  school  is  indifferent 
between two students, the tie breaking rule determines which is preferred in the school's 
artificial strict preferences). Deferred acceptance with tie breaking rule T is then simply 
the deferred acceptance algorithm operating on the strict preferences that result when T is 
applied to schools' preferences. 
 
Theorem 16 (Abdulkadiro lu, Pathak and Roth, 2007): For any tie-breaking rule T, there 
is no mechanism that is strategy proof for every student and that dominates student 
proposing deferred acceptance with tie-breaking rule T. 
 
An interesting open problem has to do with the extent to which actual welfare gains could 
be achieved using a non-strategy-proof mechanism.  Using the preference data submitted 
in  a  recent  year  by  students  in  the  New  York  City  high  school  choice  process, 
Abdulkadiro lu, Pathak and Roth (2007) show that as many as 6,000 students (out of 
around 90,000) could be made better off through stable improvement cycles.  Of course, 
this is an estimate made based on the preferences submitted in the current school choice 
mechanism,  based  on  a  student  proposing  deferred  acceptance  mechanism  with  tie   24
breaking. The efficiency losses are only identifiable because the submitted preferences 
can be taken as a reasonable approximation of true preferences, since they were elicited 
from an algorithm that is strategy proof for the large majority of students (recall that the 
NYC implementation is only approximately a deferred acceptance algorithm).   Nothing 
is now known about what kinds of preferences might be submitted (e.g. at equilibrium) of 
an algorithm that attempted to achieve the potential efficiency gains. 
 
 In turn, there would be costs to losing strategy-proofness. A strategy proof mechanism 
allows school officials to give simple advice to families about how to participate in the 
matching system. And it yields valuable preference data. (In New York City, schools 
revealed to be unpopular through the preference data have been closed.)  
 
So an interesting theoretical area with important practical implications will be to explore 
the equilibrium, incentive, and efficiency properties of mechanisms that seek to achieve 
efficiency  gains  over  deferred  acceptance  algorithms,  in  matching  markets  in  which 
indifferences are important. The properties of such mechanisms will be interesting both 
in general, and over limited domains of preferences on which results might differ. (For 
example, in the Boston schools preference data, there seems to be virtually no scope for 
student welfare gains in comparison to the student optimal stable matching.) 
 
Note that Theorem 16 doesn't say that there aren't any strategy proof mechanisms that are 
Pareto optimal for students (it only says that any such mechanism cannot always be better 
for students than deferred acceptance with tie breaking). Indeed, in the design of the 
Boston school choice system, in which stability of the final matching was not of primary 
importance (as it was in NYC), we considered another mechanism, based on the top 
trading cycles mechanism, attributed to David Gale in Shapley and Scarf (1974). That 
mechanism is strategy proof for students (Roth, 1982), and can be generalized in a way 
that potentially also would have made sense for Boston schools (Abdulkadiro lu and 
Sönmez, 1999, 2003). But that is a story for another occasion.
34  
 
5. Matching and Market Design: 
 
Although I have focused in this review on the deferred acceptance algorithm, I will end 
by briefly indicating some of the larger questions in economics that are illuminated by 
studying the kinds of markets in which deferred acceptance clearinghouses are used. A 
lot has been learned (and much more remains to be learned) about the detailed game 
                                                 
34 The top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm forms the basis of a new appeals process in the NYC high school 
choice system. It also served as an initial conceptual basis for the algorithm organizing the New England 
Program for Kidney Exchange (Roth, Sonmez, Unver 2004, 2005), although various considerations have 
since led in other directions (see e.g. Roth, Sönmez, Unver 2007, and Abraham, Blum, and Sandholm 
2007). It's possible that the roommate problem, or some related formulation might come to be of 
importance in kidney exchange (see e.g. Cechlarova, Fleiner, and Manlove [2005]).  Like the deferred 
acceptance algorithm, TTC has also been the source of elegant theory (cf. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez 
1998 and Sönmez and Unver, 2005), which connects it to the broader subject of general allocation 
mechanisms for indivisible goods (see e.g. Ergin 2002, Ehlers and Klaus 2006, Kesten 2006, Papai 2000). 
The behavior of TTC with respect to tie-breaking when preferences are not strict is surprisingly different 
from that of deferred acceptance: Pathak (2007) shows that it is insensitive to how ties are broken.   25
theoretic microstructure of markets by trying to answer these questions. Why have 
clearinghouses based on the deferred acceptance algorithm (as well as other kinds of 
clearinghouses) been of use in markets?  What are the kinds of market failure for which 
such a clearinghouse is a solution?  To put it another way, what do we learn about 
markets, and about clearinghouses organized around deferred acceptance algorithms, 
from the markets that have employed such clearinghouses? 
 
Muriel Niederle and I have gotten an unusually clear view of this by studying the market 
for Gastroenterology fellows, and helping gastroenterologists reorganize it.
35  Like the 
market for medical residents before it, this is a market with a complex history, which in 
recent years experienced periods of  
   unraveling of appointment dates so that offers were being made at early and 
dispersed times;  
   congestion in the making of offers, so that employers found that there was 
insufficient time to make all offers they would like in a timely way. (By the time a 
candidate had rejected an offer, the next choice candidate may already have 
accepted an offer elsewhere.) 
   strategic behavior in terms of the scheduling of interviews and offers, as it 
became unsafe for participants to act straightforwardly on their preferences. 
 
 To summarize, like a number of other markets, the gastroenterology fellows market 
experienced problems in maintaining a thick market, dealing with congestion when the 
market is thick, and in general making it strategically simple to participate in the market. 
  
These  problems,  together  or  separately,  are  often  the  reasons  that  markets  adopt  a 
clearinghouse.  By  making  offers  through  an  algorithm,  congestion  problems  can  be 
solved,  as  algorithms  operate  very  fast.  Furthermore,  using  a  deferred  acceptance 
algorithm makes it safe for the proposing side of the market to make offers according to 
their preferences only, and, if the market is large, this is true for both sides of the market. 
Therefore if there is sufficient participation in the centralized clearinghouse, the market is 
thick, uncongested, and safe even for nonstrategic participants. 
   
Of course, even markets that are working inefficiently may be at an equilibrium that 
makes it difficult to move them to another, better equilibrium.  In the case of the 
gastroenterology market, it had become customary for fellowship programs to hire 
internal medicine residents up to two years before they would begin employment, and 
there was interest in establishing a clearinghouse that would operate only one year before 
employment would begin.  But even though most fellowship programs were eager to 
make this transition, there was widespread concern that it would be disadvantageous to 
do so if other, competing fellowship programs continued to hire earlier than the 
                                                 
35 The market for gastroenterology fellows was organized through a centralized fellowship match, the 
Medical Specialties Matching Program (MSMP organized by the NRMP) from 1986 to the mid nineties. 
The arrangement fell apart (see McKinney, Niederle and Roth, 2005 for an investigation into the causes of 
this collapse), and for the next decade the market operated in a decentralized way. It re-established a match 
in 2006, see Niederle and Roth (2007). 
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clearinghouse.  To make it safe for programs to wait a year and participate in the match, 
the four gastroenterology professional organizations eventually adopted a resolution, 
proposed in Niederle, Proctor and Roth (2006), that allowed applicants who had accepted 
offers before the match to later change their mind and decline them if they wanted to 
participate in the match.  This changed the equilibrium in the decentralized market, and 
allowed participants to confidently plan to participate in the first run of the clearinghouse 
in June of 2006, for fellows who would begin one year later. 
 
As this illustrates, while much of market design has so far concentrated on market 
failures that can be fixed with centralized clearinghouses of one sort or another (see e.g. 
Milgrom 2004 in this connection, and Roth 2002), there is often a decentralized market or 
potential market in the background that must also be understood. One promising area of 
research will be to better understand how the problems of providing thickness, dealing 






Gale and Shapley (1962) initiated and advanced what has grown into not only a 
substantial academic literature on matching models and mechanisms, but also an 
emerging empirical literature on market failure and market organization, and a growing 
“economic engineering” practice of market design.
37  
                                                 
36 For some studies that focus on aspects of decentralized markets such as unraveling, see Damiano, Li and 
Suen (2005), Li and Rosen (1998), Li and Suen (2000, 2004), Niederle and Roth (2007), Niederle and 
Yaariv (2007), and Unver (2001). Regarding congestion in decentralized markets, I am the chair of a 
committee of the American Economic Association that is charged with suggesting changes in the job 
market for new Ph.D. economists (aside from myself, the committee consists of John Cawley, Phil Levine, 
Muriel Niederle and John Siegfried).  In 2006 the AEA instituted a system by which applicants could send, 
theough the AEA, up to two signals of interest to departments they wished to interview. This is intended to 
avoid coordination failures resulting from congestion in that market, in which departments receive many 
more applications than they can conduct interviews. 
37 Nobel committee, take note.   27
Table 1: Labor markets that adopted the Roth-Peranson clearinghouse design after 1998 (and 
date of first use of a centralized clearinghouse of some sort): 
   Postdoctoral Dental Residencies in the United States 
o  Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery (1985) 
o  General Practice Residency (1986) 
o  Advanced Education in General Dentistry (1986) 
o  Pediatric Dentistry (1989) 
o  Orthodontics (1996) 
   Psychology Internships in the United States and Canada (1999) 
   Neuropsychology Residencies in the U.S. and Canada (2001) 
   Osteopathic Internships in the United States (before 1995) 
   Pharmacy Practice Residencies in the United States (before 1994) 
   Articling Positions with Law Firms in Alberta, Canada (1993) 
   Medical Residencies in the United States (NRMP) (1952) 
   Medical Residencies in Canada (CaRMS) (before 1970) 
   Specialty Matching Services (SMS/NRMP): 
o  Abdominal Transplant Surgery (2005)  
o  Child & Adolescent Psychiatry (1995)  
o  Colon & Rectal Surgery (1984)  
o  Combined Musculoskeletal Matching Program (CMMP)  
   Hand Surgery (1990)  
o  Medical Specialties Matching Program (MSMP)  
   Cardiovascular Disease (1986)  
   Gastroenterology (1986-1999; rejoined in 2006)  
   Hematology (2006)  
   Hematology/Oncology (2006)  
   Infectious Disease (1986-1990; rejoined in 1994)  
   Oncology (2006)  
   Pulmonary and Critical Medicine (1986)  
   Rheumatology (2005)  
o  Minimally Invasive and Gastrointestinal Surgery (2003)  
o  Obstetrics/Gynecology  
   Reproductive Endocrinology (1991)  
   Gynecologic Oncology (1993)  
   Maternal-Fetal Medicine (1994)  
   Female Pelvic Medicine & Reconstructive Surgery (2001)  
o  Ophthalmic Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery (1991)  
o  Pediatric Cardiology (1999)  
o  Pediatric Critical Care Medicine (2000)  
o  Pediatric Emergency Medicine (1994)  
o  Pediatric Hematology/Oncology (2001)  
o  Pediatric Rheumatology (2004)  
o  Pediatric Surgery (1992)  
o  Primary Care Sports Medicine (1994)  
o  Radiology  
   Interventional Radiology (2002)  
   Neuroradiology (2001)  
   Pediatric Radiology (2003)  
o  Surgical Critical Care (2004)  
o  Thoracic Surgery (1988)  
o  Vascular Surgery (1988)   28
References: 
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila,  Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, ''The New York City 
High School Match,'' American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, 
May, 2005, 364-367. 
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, ''Strategy-proofness 
versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School 
Match,'' working paper, November 2006. 
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez, ''The 
Boston Public School Match,'' American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
95,2, May, 2005, 368-371.  
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez, 
''Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism,'' working paper, January 2006. 
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila and Tayfun Sönmez [1998], " Random Serial Dictatorship and 
the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems” (joint with 
Atila), Econometrica 66: 689-701, May 
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila and Tayfun Sönmez [1999], "House Allocation with Existing 
Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 233-260.  
Abdulkadiro lu, Atila and Tayfun Sönmez [2002], “School Choice: A Mechanism 
Design Approach,” American Economic Review, 93, 729-747. 
Abeledo, Hernan G. and Garth Isaak [1991], "A Characterization of Graphs which 
Assure the Existence of Stable Matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, 22, 93-96.  
Abeledo, Hernan G. and Uriel G. Rothblum [1995],  “Courtship and Linear 
Programming,” Linear Algebra and its Applications, 216: 111-124. 
Abraham, D., Blum, A., and Sandholm, T.  2007.  Clearing Algorithms for Barter 
Exchange Markets: Enabling Nationwide Kidney Exchanges.  In Proceedings of the 
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC). 
 
Adachi, Hiroyuki [2000], "On a Characterization of Stable Matchings," Economic 
Letters, 68, 43--49. 
 
Aldershof, Brian and Olivia M. Carducci [1996], ``Stable Matchings with Couples," 
Discrete Applied Mathematics, (68)1-2 (1996) pp. 203-207. 
 
Alkan, Ahmet [1988], “Nonexistence of Stable Threesome Matchings,” Mathematical 
Social Sciences, 16, pp207-209.   29
Artemov, Georgy [2007], “Matching and Price Competition: Would Personalized 
Prices Help?” International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming. 
Avery, Christopher, Andrew Fairbanks, and Richard Zeckhauser. The Early 
Admissions Game: Joining the Elite. Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, "The 
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks", University of Chicago Law Review, 68, 3, 
Summer, 2001, 793-902. 
Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth [2007], 
“The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks”, University of Chicago Law 
Review, forthcoming. 
Balinski, Michel and Tayfun Sönmez [1999], "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student 
Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, 84, 73-94. 
Becker, Gary S. [1981], A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Blair, Charles [1988], "The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with 
Multiple Partners," Mathematics of Operations Research, 13, pp619-628.  
 
Bulow, Jeremy and Jonathan Levin [2006] “Matching and Price Competition,” 
American Economic Review, 96, 3, June, 652-658. 
 
Cechlarova, Katarina, Tamas Fleiner, and David Manlove [2005], "The Kidney 
Exchange Game," Proc. SOR '05 (2005), Eds. L. Zadnik-Stirn, S. Drobne, 77-83. 
 
Chung, Kim-Sau [2000], “On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings,” Games 
and Economic Behavior 33(2), 206-230 (2000) 
 
Crawford, Vincent P. "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary 
Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," forthcoming, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 
 
Crawford, Vincent P. and Elsie Marie Knoer [1981], "Job Matching with 
Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, 49, pp437-450.  
 
Damiano, Ettore, Hao Li, and Wing Suen (2005), “Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting,” 
Review of Economic Studies 72 (4), 1057–1076. 
 
Demange, Gabrielle and David Gale [1985] "The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided 
Matching Markets," Econometrica, 53, pp873-888. 
   30
Demange, Gabrielle, David Gale, and Marilda Sotomayor [1986] “Multi-Item 
Auctions,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp863-872. 
Dubins, L.E. and D.A. Freedman [1981], "Machiavelli and the Gale- Shapley 
Algorithm." American Mathematical Monthly, 88, pp485-494.  
Echenique, Federico and Jorge Oviedo [2004] `Core Many-to-one Matchings by 
Fixed Point Methods''  Journal of Economic Theory, 115,  2, April,  358-376. 
 
Echenique, Federico and Jorge Oviedo [2006], "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-
many Matching Markets, “Theoretical Economics,1,  2, June, 233-273. 
 
Echenique, Federico and M. Bumin Yenmez (2007) , “A solution to matching with 
preferences over colleagues,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 1, April, 46-71 
 
Ehlers, Lars and Bettina Klaus [2006], “Efficient Priority Rules,” Games and 
Economic Behavior, 55, 372-384. 
 
Erdil, Aytek and Haluk Ergin [2007], What's the Matter with Tie-breaking? 
Improving Efficiency in School Choice, American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
 
Erdil, Aytek, and Haluk Ergin [2006] "Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences," 
working paper.  
 
Ergin, Haluk [2002] "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," 
November, Econometrica, 70(6), 2489-2497 
 
Ergin, Haluk and Tayfun Sonmez [2006] "Games of School Choice under the Boston 
Mechanism,”  Journal of Public Economics, 90, 215-237. 
 
Fleiner, Tamas [2000], Stable and Crossing Structures, Ph.D. dissertation,  Centrum 
voor Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI), Amsterdam,  
http://www.renyi.hu/~fleiner/dissertation.pdf  
 
Fleiner, Tamas [2003], "A Fixed-Point Approach To Stable Matchings and Some 
Applications," Mathematics of Operations Research, 28, 1, February, 103-126 
 
Fréchette, Guillaume, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver, “Unraveling Yields 
Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls,” Rand 
Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley [1962], “College Admissions and the Stability of 
Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15. 
 
Gale, David and Marilda Sotomayor [1985] "Ms Machiavelli and the Stable Matching 
Problem," American Mathematical Monthly, 92, 261-268.   31
 
Guillen, Pablo and Onur Kesten [2007], "On-Campus Housing: Theory vs. 
Experiment," working paper, April, Carnegie Mellon University. 
 
Gusfield, Dan and Robert W. Irving.  The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and 
Algorithms.  MIT Press, 1989. 
 
Hatfield, John William and Fuhito Kojima [2007], “Matching with Contracts: 
Corrigendum,” June, working paper. 
 
Hatfield, John William and Paul Milgrom [2005], “Matching with Contracts,” 
American Economic Review, 95(4), September,  913-935. 
 
Immorlica, Nicole and Mohammad Mahdian [2005], "Marriage, Honesty, and 
Stability," SODA 2005, 53-62. 
 
Irving, Robert W. [1985] "An efficient algorithm for the "stable roommates" 
problem,"  Journal of Algorithms, 6, 577--595. 
  
 Irving, Robert W. [1998] "Matching medical students to pairs of hospitals: a new 
variation on an old theme', in Proceedings of ESA'98, the Sixth Annual European 
Symposium on Algorithms, Venice Italy, 1998, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
vol. 1461, Springer-Verlag, 381-392.  
Irving RW, Manlove DF, Scott S [2000] The hospitals/residents problem with ties  
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1851: 259-271. 
Kagel, John H. and A.E. Roth, "The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: 
A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February, 2000, 201-235. 
 
Kamecke, Ulrich [1998], "Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market," 
International Economic Review, 39, 1, February, 33-53. 
Kelso, Alexander S.,Jr. and Vincent P. Crawford [1982], "Job Matching, Coalition 
Formation, and Gross Substitutes", Econometrica, 50, pp 1483-1504.  
Kesten, Onur [2004], “Student Placement to Public Schools in US: Two New 
Solutions,” working paper, Carnegie Mellon University. 
Kesten, Onur [2006] On Two Competing Mechanisms for Priority Based Allocation 
Problems, Journal of Economic Theory 127, 155-171. 
Klaus, Bettina and Flip Klijn (2005): “Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,” 
Journal of Economic Theory, 121(1), 75-106. 
   32
Knuth, Donald E. [1976], Mariages Stables, Montreal, Les Presses de l'Universite de 
Montreal.  
 
Kojima, Fuhito [2007], “Matching and Price Competition: Comment,” American 
Economic Review, 97, 3(June), 1027-1031. 
 
Kojima, Fuhito and Parag Pathak [2007], “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-
Sided Matching Markets,” working paper. 
 
Li, Hao and Sherwin Rosen [1998], "Unraveling in Matching Markets," American 
Economic Review, 88, 3, June, 371-387.  
 
Li, Hao and Wing Suen [2000], "Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting," 
Journal of Political Economy, 108, 5, 1058-1091. 
 
Li, Hao and Wing Suen [2004], "Self-Fulfilling Early-Contracting Rush," 
International Economic Review, February, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 301-324(24)  
 
Manlove, David F., Rob Irving, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki and Yasufumi 
Morita [2002], "Hard Variants of Stable Marriage," Theoretical Computer Science, 
276 (1-2) : 261-279. 
 
Martínez, Ruth, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, and Jorge Oviedo [2001], “On the 
Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings for a Many-to-one Model,” 
Optimization 50, 439-457. 
 
Martínez, Ruth, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, and Jorge Oviedo [2004], "An 
algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matching," Mathematical 
Social Sciences, 47, 187-210. 
 
McKinney, C. Nicholas, Muriel Niederle, and Alvin E. Roth, “The collapse of a 
medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare),” American Economic 
Review, 95, 3, June, 2005,878-889. 
 
McVitie, D. G. and L. B. Wilson [1970], "Stable Marriage Assignments for Unequal 
Sets," BIT, 10, pp295-309. 
 
McVitie and Wilson [1971], "The stable marriage problem," Communications of the 
ACM, 486-493 
 
Milgrom, Paul [2004] Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mullin, F.J. and John M. Stalnaker [1952],  "The Matching Plan for Internship 
Placement:  A Report of the First Year's Experience,"  Journal of Medical Education, 
27, 193-200. 
   33
Niederle, Muriel [forthcoming], “Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered 
Contracts,” American Economic Review, December, 2007. 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, “Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a 
Match in Medical Fellowships,” JAMA. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, vol. 290, No. 9, September 3, 2003, 1153-1154. 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, “Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market:  
Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match,” Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 111, no. 6, December 2003, 1342-1352. 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, “The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: 
Should there be a Match?,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
95,2, May, 2005, 372-375. 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, “The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How 
it failed, and why it could succeed once again,” Gastroenterology, 127, 2 August 
2004, 658-666. 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, “The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job 
placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices: Gastroenterology Fellows as a Case Study," 
NBER volume, forthcoming. 
 
Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor, and Alvin E. Roth, “What will be needed for 
the new GI fellowship match to succeed?” Gastroenterology, January, 2006, 130, 
218-224. 
 
Niederle, Muriel and Leeat Yariv [2007], "Matching through Decentralized Markets," 
working paper, Stanford University. 
 
Ostrovsky, Michael, [2007] Stability in Supply Chain Networks, working paper 
(revised), Stanford University GSB. 
 
Papai, Szilvia [2000] "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," 
Econometrica, 68: 1403-1433 .  
 
Pathak, Parag [2007], "Lotteries in Student Assignment," working paper. 
 
Pathak, Parag and Tayfun Sönmez [2007], “Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and 
Strategic Players in the Boston Mechanism,” working paper. 
 
Public Law 108-218; Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, SEC. 207., 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ218.108.pdf  
   34




Ronn, Eytan [1990], " NP-complete stable matching problems," Journal of 
Algorithms, 11, 2, June, 285-304. 
 
Roth, A.E. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of 
Operations Research, Vol. 7, 1982a, 617-628.  
 
Roth, A.E. "Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods", Economics 
Letters, Vol. 9, 1982b, 127-132.  
Roth, Alvin E. [1984], "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and 
Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, 92, 991-
1016.  
Roth, A.E. "The College Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage 
Problem," Journal of Economic Theory,  36, 1985, 277-288.   
 
Roth, A.E.  "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals:  A General Property 
of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, 54, 1986, 425-427.  
Roth, A.E. "New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization," 
Science, 250, 1990, 1524-1528.  
Roth, Alvin E. [1991], "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level 
Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.," 
American Economic Review,  81, June, 415-440.  
Roth, Alvin E. “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics 
and Computation as Tools of Design Economics,” Fisher Schultz lecture, 
Econometrica, 70, 4, July 2002, 1341-1378 
 
Roth, Alvin E.  “The origins, history, and design of the resident match,” JAMA. 
Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 289, No. 7, February 19, 2003, 
909-912. 
 
Roth, A.E. and E. Peranson, "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American 
Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,” American Economic 
Review, 89, 4, September, 1999, 748-780. 
 
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver, "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 119, 2, May, 2004, 457-488. 
   35
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver, “A Kidney Exchange 
Clearinghouse in New England,” American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 95,2, May, 2005, 376-380. 
 
Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver  “Efficient Kidney Exchange: 
Coincidence of Wants in a Market with Compatibility-Based Preferences,” American 
Economic Review, June 2007, 97, 3(June), 828-851. 
 
Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor  "Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching 
Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 45, 1988, 85-101. 
 
Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," 
Econometrica, Vol. 57, 1989, 559-570.  
 
Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor Two-Sided Matching:  A Study in Game-Theoretic 
Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
 
Roth, A.E. and Vande Vate, J.H.  "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided 
Matching," Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1475-1480. 
 
Roth, A.E. and X. Xing  "Jumping the Gun:  Imperfections and Institutions Related to 
the Timing of Market Transactions,"  American Economic Review, 84, September, 
1994, 992-1044. 
 
Roth, A.E. and X. Xing  "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing:  
Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of 
Political Economy, 105, April 1997,  284-329. 
 
Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik [1972], “The Assignment Game I: The 
Core,” International Journal of Game Theory, 1, pp111-130. 
 
Shapley, Lloyd S. and Herbert Scarf [1974], "On Cores and Indivisibility," Journal of 
Mathematical Economics, 1, pp23-28.  
 
Sönmez, Tayfun [1997], "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching 
Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 1, November, 197-204. 
 
Sönmez, Tayfun [1999], "Can Pre-Arranged Matches be Avoided in Two-Sided 
Matching Markets?" Journal of Economic Theory, 86, 148-56. 
 
Sönmez, Tayfun and M. Utku Ünver [2005], “House Allocation with Existing 
Tenants: An Equivalence,” Games and Economic Behavior 52, July, 153-185. 
 
Sotomayor, Marilda [1996], "A Non Constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence 
of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, 13, March, 135-7.    36
 
Sotomayor, Marilda [2000], Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for 
a unified matching market, Mathematical Social Sciences, 39, 119-132. 
 
Sotomayor, Marilda [2007], “Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures 
of the multiple-partners assignment game,” Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 1, 
May, 155-174. 
 
Tan, J.J.M. [1991], "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of a 
Complete Stable Matching,"  Journal of Algorithms, 12(1), 154-178. 
 
Tarski, Alfred [1955], “A Lattice Theoretical Fixpoint Theorem and Its 
Applications,” Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5, 2. 
 
Ünver, M. Utku [2001]"Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic 
Behavior in the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets" Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 25, 1039-1080.   37
 
Appendix: The 1952 medical match deferred acceptance algorithm (from Roth, 1984) 
 
The 1952 algorithm began by editing the rank order lists submitted by medical students 
and hospital internship programs, by removing from each hospital program's rank-order 
list any student who did not rank that program as acceptable, and by removing from each 
student's list any hospital that did not rank that student as acceptable.  The edited lists are 
thus rank orderings of mutually acceptable alternatives. 
 
    These lists are entered into a list-processing algorithm consisting of a matching phase 
and a tentative-assignment-and-update  phase.  The first step of the matching phase (the 
1:1 step) checks to see if there are any students and hospital programs which are top-
ranked in one another's ranking.  (If a hospital hi has a quota of qi then the qi highest 
students in its ranking are top-ranked).  If no such matches are found, the matching phase 
proceeds to the 2:1 step, at which the second ranked hospital program on each student's 
ranking is compared with the top-ranked students on that hospital's ranking.  At any step 
when no matches are found, the algorithm proceeds to the next step, so the generic k:1 
step of the matching phase seeks to find student-hospital pairs such that the student is 
top-ranked on the hospital's ranking and the hospital is kth ranked by the student.  At any 
step where such matches are found, the algorithm proceeds to the tentative-assignment-
and-update phase. 
 
    When the algorithm enters the tentative-assignment-and-update phase from the k:1 step 
of the matching phase, the k:1 matches are tentatively made; i.e., each student who is a 
top-ranked choice of his kth choice hospital is tentatively assigned to that hospital.  The 
rankings of the students and hospitals are then updated in the following way.  Any 
hospital which a student sj ranks lower than his tentative assignment is deleted from his 
ranking (so the updated ranking of a student sj tentatively assigned to his kth choice now 
lists only his first k choices) and student sj is deleted from the ranking of any hospital 
which was deleted from sj's ranking (so the updated rankings of each hospital now 
include only those applicants who haven't yet been tentatively assigned to a hospital they 
prefer).  Note that, if one of a hospital's top-ranked candidates is deleted from its ranking, 
then a lower-ranked choice moves into the top-ranked category, since the hospital's 
updated ranking has fewer students, but the same quota, as its original ranking.  When the 
rankings have been updated in this way, the algorithm returns to the start of the matching 
phase, which examines the updated rankings for new matches. 
 
    Any new tentative matches found in the matching phase replace prior tentative matches 
involving the same student.  (Note that new tentative matches can only improve a 
student's tentative assignment, since all lower ranked hospitals have been deleted from 
his ranking.)  The algorithm terminates when no new tentative matches are found, at 
which point tentative matches become final.  That is, the algorithm matches students with 
the hospitals to which they are tentatively matched when the algorithm terminates. 
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Figure 1: the 1952 deferred acceptance algorithm (from Roth, 1984) 
 
 
Roth (1984) showed that the algorithm terminates at the hospital optimal stable matching, 
and so is the same matching mechanism as the hospital proposing GS deferred 
acceptance algorithm.  To see how the algorithms themselves are different, note that the 
GS algorithm can operate on unedited preferences: if a student who is top-ranked by a 
hospital does not list that hospital as acceptable, the GS algorithm treats this as a rejection 
of the hospital’s offer, and moves on.  But if the 1952 medical match algorithm were to 
use unedited preferences, this could cause it to terminate at an unstable matching. To see 
this, consider a student who is top ranked by some hospital h, but does not list that 
hospital, and suppose this student is unmatched (i.e. he only lists hospitals that fill all 
their positions before he becomes one of their top-ranked choices). Then at no point in 
the algorithm is he tentatively assigned, and so he is never deleted from hospital h’s list, 
and so the algorithm terminates with h having an empty place, even if there are other 
students with whom hospital h forms a blocking pair. Thus, in the 1952 deferred 
acceptance algorithm, the initial editing to produce lists of mutually acceptable 




Initial editing of rank order lists to lists of mutually acceptable alternatives 
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(n =max length student 
preference list, k:1 means kth on 
student’s list, top-ranked on 
hospital’s) 
Make all indicated assignments 
 
Delete all lower ranked hospitals 
from each assigned student’s list 
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from the list of each hospital program 
that they ranked lower than their 
tentative match 
Stop: all students are now assigned to the hospital program at the 
bottom of their modified list 
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